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SOME METHODS OF INFLUENCING PROVINCE'S FIXED ASSET INVESTMENTS 
Some lessons from foreign law and experience 
As an important aspect of difficulties relating to fixed asset 
investments in China, provincial and township administrators (need 
to specificy precisely which ones if possible) have either directly 
invested local funds, or encouraged township enterprises to invest 
funds (often with funds borrowed from commercial banks) in the 
wrong kinds of projects . 
A review of ROCCIPI research agenda suggests hypotheses as to 
existing factors likely to influence the relevant provincial 
administrators' investment behaviors; if facts prove those factors 
do influence their investment behavior, then foreign law and 
experience may prove helpful in designing measures to help change 
those factors, leading to more desirable patterns of investment: 
Rule: 
Explanatory hypotheses: Existing rules remain vague, so 
relevant provincial administrators make fixed asset investment 
decisions · (affecting direct government funds, as well as funds 
borrowed from banks, pension, or other funds) without adequate 
guidelines. Existing legislation provides inadequate monitoring 
and evaluation processes and gives national authorities means of 
changing the advministrators' investment behaviors. 
Solution (new bill) should identify the national authority to 
monitor and evaluate existing provincial administrators' investment 
behaviors, and give it power to a) conduct necessary research and 
formulate appropriate guidelines governing provincial 
administrators' fixed asset investment behaviors; b) various means 
of altering the factors that presently contribute to causing those 
undesirable behaviors (as suggested in review of rest of ROCCIPI ( 
categories, below). 
Opportunity and capacity: 
Explanatory hypotheses: Reforms have given provincial 
authorities the opportunity to make direct investment decisions and 
influence provincial enterprise investment decisions, but they have 
neither the necessary knowledge nor skills to make them in ways 
likely to ensure balanced integrated national dwevelopment. Few, 
especially outside of the coastal provinces, have any training in 
assessing how local investment projects will affect provincial, let 
alone national development; and no opportunity for learning from 
discussions of those projects' likely impact with other provincial 
or national authorities. Furthermore, provincial workers may not 
have necessary skills to 
provide the essential work force for desired projects. 
Solution (new bill) should ensure appropriate institutions 
provide adequate training for provincial administrators, and ensure · 
they have the opportunity to participate in some form of national 
plan coordination process to establish agreed-upon investment 
'· 
guidelines. (How do Japan, France, Canada deal with these issues?) 
: Educational institutions should provide appropriate skills training 
for local workers (eg Japan's central educational authorities help 
local governments establish retraining facilities for workers laid 
off by declining industries to enable them to do work required by 
desired new projects like local factories producing parts for hi-
tech industries) . 
Communication: 
Explanatory hypotheses: Under reforms, the state council has 
informed provincial administrators they. have the power to make 
fixed asset investment decisions, but the vague existing rules 
offer them no guidance as to the kinds of investments to make. 
Solution (new bill) should ensure communication of agreed-upon 
regulations to provincial administrators. (How do other 
governments these this kind of information to provincial 
authorities?) 
Interest: 
Explanatory hypotheses: Under reforms, relevant provincial 
authorities expect to receive increased immediate revenues and the 
support of local citizens if provincial fixed assets investments 
provide immediate profits and provide increased wage employment --
regardless of their possible impact on long-term national and 
regional development prospects. 
Solution (new bill) should provide central government 
authority (the executive arm of the proposed coordinating agency) 
with a variety of ways of creating incentives to invest in more 
desirable fixed assets (BUT in every case, the executive must 
carefully weigh the social costs against the social benefits) . 
Possible ways of creating incentives might include: 
tax subsidies - ie reduce taxes on income generated by desired 
investment projects selected according to specified criteria 
(almost all developed country governments use these; note 
discussion of developing countries' tax incentives for foreign 
investors in Song, Introduction t 'o Law and Legal System of 
Korea, pp. 545ff); 
reduced interest rates - ie lower interest on loans made by 
state-owned banks (often, but not always, separate development 
banks) for desired projects (many countries use this, 
including Japan and South Korea; eg see Song, pp. 532ff); 
matching grants for desired projects - ie central government · 
invests 100 yuan for every 100 yuan invested by provincial 
authorities in desired projects (used by US at various times 
to encourage investments in specific kinds of research, 
training, redevelopment projects for inner cities, etc.) 
foreign exchange controls and tariffs may provide 
preferential treatment in obtaining foreign exchange or 
reducing tariffs or quantitative controls on necessary imports 
for desired projects (eg Song, re developing countries' 
measures to attract foriegn investment, pp. 553ff) 
negative incentives might include: taxing undesirable 
investments more heavily; raising interest rates or denying 
loans for undesirable investments; withdrawing central 
government funds from other projects; etc. 
In addition, the solution (bill) should provide for education 
of provincial citizens to help them understand why, in the long 
run, some kinds of fixed asset investments, rather than others, 
will more likely provide steady employment growth, higher incomes 
and improved quality of life for all Chinese citizens. 
Process: 
Explanatory hypotheses: Provincial administrators make their 
decisions without adequate inputs either from other provincial or 
national authorities, according to criteria and in line with 
procedures that take into account only provincial concerns and 
short-term citizen interests, with little or no feedback mechanisms 
exist to ensure that they learn of the negative consequences of 
these processes (note description in Song, summarized on p. 517, of 
large enterprises' misuse of incentives in an inadequately open, 
monitored system; and discussion of the Korean coordinating 
committee that deals with providing tax incentives) 
The solution (the new bill) should 
1) enable provincial administrators to participate in a 
national investment coordinating mechanism to ensure that they 
take part in formulating and understand the reasons for 
national investment guidelines and can communicate them to 
their own citizens; 
2) require provincial administrators to establish provincial 
criteria and procedures, that require consideration of inputs 
related to national development as well as from local 
communities' citizens; and 
3) ensure adequate provincial-level feedback, that is, 
research (conducted in accord with nationally-agreed research 
guidelines that take into account nationally-generated 
information as well as local community-member participation) 
to assess the consequences of specific fixed asset investments 
(eg US legislation sometimes requires government agencies to 
. give university faculty members the opportunity to bid on 
contracts to conduct research according to pre-determined . 
guidelines to assess US state or national investments in 
programs relating to such different issues as education, 
housing, and foreign aid.) 
., 
note Kitigawa, Doing Business in Japan, on detailed 
regulations of the standardization system, including the way 
the implementing agency tries to ensure protection against 
corruption, eg. pp. All-2-2lff; and flow diagram which details 
the process) 
Ideology: 
Explanatory hypotheses: The simple notion that to get rich is 
glorious tends to emphasize short term personal profits without 
concern for long term social consequences. 
The solution (the new bill) should ~nsure that every element 
of the solution suggested above (training, communication, 
incentives, and processes, including feedback mechanisms) 
contributes to educating provincial administrators and citizens 
throughout China that short-term profitable investments may have 
negative long-term consequences which they must learn to take into 
account. 
